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Synonyms
Affordance;  Ecological  psychology;  Direct  perception;  Environment-organism  systems;
Information based-approach; Perception-action theory; Social interaction; Social Cognition;
Definition
Social affordances are possibilities for social interaction or possibilities for action that are
shaped by social practices and norms.
Affordance
The term “affordance” was coined by James Gibson to refer to what things or events in the
environment afford to an organism. For instance, a rigid flat surface affords support and
locomotion to terrestrial animals. It is stand-on-able and walk-on-able (Gibson 2015). The
water surface of a lake does not afford support to a terrestrial animal, but it does to some
flies. Thus, the same part of an environment may afford different things to different species
or organisms. This is because affordances are relational in nature, they are both a fact of
the environment and a fact of the organism. According to Gibson, affordances are neither
subjective nor objective, they cut across the dichotomy of subjective-objective. There has
been debate among ecological psychologists as to what in the organism is responsible for
an  affordance.  The  options  range  from  bodily  properties  to  dispositions  to  abilities
(Chemero 2003).  In all cases, such organismic elements are what turns a feature of the
environment into a possibility for action that is meaningful to the organism.
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Affordances are crucial for the ecological approach to perception. The environment shows
up to an organism in terms of what in can do in it. An organism perceives by picking up
environmental information that specifies the affordances of the environment. This point is
crucial  to  understand  Gibson’s  approach  to  perception.  According  to  the  ecological
approach,  the  environment  is  rich  of  structures  and  energy  patterns  that  convey
information about objects and events. Information for Gibson is a relation of specification
established  by  lawful  covariation  between  patterns  of  energy—optical,  mechanical,
chemical—over time and/or space and objects or events in the environment. For instance,
structured ambient light conveys information about surfaces of objects. As this information
is structured over time and/or space, the organism needs to explore its environment to
pick it up. Gibson explains the process of picking up information by the radio metaphor.
Through  exploratory  movements,  the  organism  becomes  attuned  to  environmental
information and resonates to it. Inasmuch as an organism resonates to information, it is
able to perceive affordances directly. Thus, perception is an active process that takes place
over time and whose main function is to pick up information that specifies affordances.
Social Affordance
Although Gibson didn’t systematize theoretically the notion of social affordances (Costall
1995), he was open to it and gave several examples of social affordances. His example of
the  postbox  as  an  object  that  “affords  letter-mailing  to  a  letter-writing  human  in  a
community with a postal system” (Gibson 2015,  130) is well  known. Gibson also called
attention to the fact that an animal, as a self-moving being with characteristic behaviors
and  anatomy,  affords  peculiar  possibilities  for  action to  other  animals.  An animal  “can
afford eating or being eaten, copulation or fighting, nurturing or nurturance.” (Gibson 2015,
36). Some of the latter examples, such as eating and being eaten, may not yet be considered
full  social  affordances  inasmuch  as  they  elicit  behavior  in  another  animal  but  not
necessarily social interaction. To have social interactions the participatory animals must
have a minimal responsiveness to each other as self-moving beings and their behaviors
must be mutually constrained while they are engaged in an activity. As Gibson points out,
“as one moves so does the other, the one sequence of action being suited to the other in a
kind of behavioral loop. All social interaction is of this sort—sexual, maternal, competitive,
cooperative” (Gibson 2015, 36). Thus, in virtue of the coupling between the caregiver and
the infant in several mammals, the caregiver affords the infant the possibility to clung and
contact comfort. For species capable of joint attention, the joint perception of a predator
might  afford  the  social  affordance  of  outnumbering  our  foe.  Among  some  primates,
grooming behavior affords social bonds.
The example of the postbox and the examples of social interactions point to two different
senses in which the term ‘social affordance’ is normally used. In the postbox case the letter-
mailing affordance is social because it depends on an ongoing social-cultural practice to be
available. An agent from a culture without a postal system and having no idea of what a
postal system is cannot perceive the postbox as affording letter-mailing. To be open to this
affordance, the agent needs to be normatively responsive to and constrained by the social
practice in question. In contrast to generic affordances, which can be understood in terms
of the individual-object dyad, this type of social affordance requires also the social system
of mutual responsibilities and conventions within which an object gains a peculiar function.
In relation to social creatures like us there has been debate about whether all affordances
are socially shaped in this way (Costall 1995). As to the second group of social affordances,
they are social because they are possibilities for interaction that other persons or animals
afford. Through these affordances a person or an animal shows up to an observer not as a
physical object but as an agent with the capacity to reciprocate. These are “the richest and
most elaborate affordances of the environment,”  (Gibson 2015,  126) they comprise the
most basic kind of social cognition that makes cooperation and coordination possible, as
well  as  predator-prey  interactions.  This  type  of  social  affordance  is  allegedly  more
fundamental since it seems to be required by the social-cultural practices that underpin the
first type of social affordance.
A common criticism of the very possibility of perceiving social affordances is that there is
no information about them in the environment. As the argument goes, the ambient light
might contain information about objects, their surface layout, texture, and colors, but not
about whether they afford, for instance, letter-mailing. The social function of an object is
not perceptible. An agent comes to know that a postbox has this function only by inference.
The same applies  to  social  affordances  regarding persons and animals.  Possibilities  for
interaction are allegedly not perceptible, there is no information in the environment about
whether an animal affords cooperation or aggression. An animal can see movements and
facial expressions of another animal but not that it is open to and waiting for interaction.
Gibson himself claims that “other animals and other persons can only give off information
about themselves insofar as they are tangible, audible, odorous, tastable, or visible,” (2015,
127) which raises the question about whether other animals and other persons can give off
perceptible information about their social affordances.
A set of considerations may help to put away the worry above. The first point to notice is
that the animal’s movements, gestures and facial expressions can be sufficiently patterned
over time and/or space to specify a wide range of possibilities for interaction. By picking up
such a pattern, an observer may be said to perceive directly the corresponding possibility
for interaction. This, however,  might not be enough to resolve all possible ambiguity.  A
second consideration  concerns the notion  of  information itself.  One possibility  to  have
more information in the environment regarding social affordances is to weaken the notion
of  information.  Instead  of  requiring  a  specifying  relationship,  it  may  be  enough  a
probabilistic relationship between an energy pattern and a social affordance in that the
former makes the presence of the latter likely (Bruineberg et al. 2019). Another alternative
would be to relativize the notion of information to environments or habitats. A specifying
relationship does not need to hold over all environments to make perception possible. A
local specifying relationship that holds only in a specific environment might be sufficient to
perception provided the perceiver dwells in that environment. Thus, optical information
about the postbox might be sufficient to specify the letter-mailing affordance in a social
environment where there is a postal system.
A further consideration on this issue is that the social environment should not be taken as
detached  from  the  natural  environment;  actually  the  dichotomy  between  nature  and
culture should be overcome. For many species, particularly ours, the social is a background
condition  not  only for  their  evolutionary history but  also for  the  development  of  their
members (Heft 2007) so that a new member with cooperative dispositions enters in an
environment which is already socially structured. In relation to practices within a social
environment, complex energy patterns may convey information about social affordances
for beings with pro-social capabilities immersed in those practices. 
Both  affordances  shaped  by  social  norms  and  affordances  for  social  interaction  are
important for ecological psychology to address the scaling up problem—the problem of
accounting for the higher-order cognition, such as planning, imagination, abstract thought
and language use based on basic cognition such as the perception of affordances. Attempts
have been made to apply social affordances to explain planning (Kiverstein and Rietveld
2018). Synergies between ecological psychology and enactivism have been explored. Some
argue that an enactive account of language can augment social affordances to deal with
planning and distal  engagement  (Brancazio  and Segundo-Ortin  2020).  In  anthropology,
social affordances have been mobilized to overcome the dichotomy between nature and
culture and to show how the human living world is  socially structured and meaningful
independently of symbolic thought (Ingold 2000).
The  realm  of  social  interactions  has  also  been  studied  within  ecological  psychology,
providing  a  rich  repertoire  of  subtypes  of  social  affordances  to  explain  complex  social
behavior.  One  may  distinguish,  for  instance,  common  affordance  from  joint/shared
affordance.  The  former  is  the  affordance  of  an  object  that  may  induce  emergent
coordination, such as the arrival of a bus awaited by many passengers. The latter is “an
affordance for two or more people collectively which is not necessarily an affordance for
any of them individually,” (Knoblich et al. 2011, 63) such as a long two-handled saw that
affords cutting to two people acting together but not to one acting alone. Both common and
joint/shared  affordances  are  also  distinct  from  collective  affordances.  These  are
affordances available to collectives—groups of individuals who share an embodied social
identity. For instance, during a match of football, the situation in the pitch may offer the
collective affordance to play a counterattack to the recently attacked team (Weichold and
Thonhauser 2020). Thus, social affordances provide a powerful resource to explain a great
variety of social interactions and how they may combine to give rise to complex cognition
and behavior.
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